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Virtual reality can be used to visually substitute a person’s body by a life-sized virtual
one. Such embodiment results in a perceptual illusion of body ownership over the virtual
body (VB). Previous research has shown that the form of the VB can influence implicit
attitudes. In particular, embodying White people in a Black virtual body is associated
with an immediate decrease in their implicit racial bias against Black people. We tested
whether the reduction in implicit bias lasts for at least 1 week and whether it is enhanced
by multiple exposures. Two experiments were carried out with a total of 90 female
participants where the virtual body was either Black or White. Participants were required
to follow a virtual Tai Chi teacher who was either Asian or European Caucasian. Each
participant had 1, 2, or 3 exposures separated by days. Implicit racial bias was measured
1 week before their first exposure and 1 week after their last. The results show that implicit
bias decreased more for those with the Black virtual body than the White. There was
also some evidence of a general decrease in bias independently of body type for which
possible explanations are put forward.
Keywords: racial bias, racism, body ownership, virtual reality, implicit association test, rubber hand illusion, Tai Chi
INTRODUCTION
There are many interventions discussed in the literature designed to have the effect of reducing
implicit racial bias of “White” people toward “Black” people. Seventeen interventions were
described and evaluated by Lai et al. (2014) of which the most successful were those that involved
examples that ran against stereotypical behavior, and the least effective involved perspective taking
or invoking egalitarian values. However, in a subsequent study Lai et al. (2016) found that no
intervention was successful in inducing a sustained reduction of racial bias whether for hours
or days. In this paper we show how the technique of virtual embodiment, where a light-skinned
person’s body is visually substituted in immersive virtual reality by a life-sized spatially coincident
dark-skinned virtual body, results in a reduction in implicit bias that lasts at least 1 week. The results
provide a replication of earlier results described by Peck et al. (2013) and extend those results by
considering whether the reduction of bias is sustained, and whether there is any effect of multiple
exposures.
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Several studies have shown that when people are virtually
embodied or represented online with a virtual body different
to their own then they exhibit behaviors concomitant with
attributes of that body. Yee and Bailenson (2007) referred to
this as the Proteus Effect. They reported, for example, that when
participants have a virtual body that has a more attractive face
than their real one their proxemics behavior alters—they stand
closer to virtual representations of other people than when the
virtual face is less attractive. People will become more aggressive
in negotiation with others if embodied in a virtual body that is
taller than if shorter (Yee and Bailenson, 2007). They also showed
that when aWhite person is put into a scenario of a job interview
but embodied in a Black virtual body they will later exhibit greater
implicit racial bias against Black people than if in a White virtual
body (Groom et al., 2009).
The Proteus Effect is premised on Self-Perception Theory
(Bem, 1972). This argues that people observe their own behaviors
in the given context and infer their attitudes based on what they
themselves do in that situation. It has also been argued that
stereotyping plays a role in this, where people behave as others
would expect someone with that type of body to behave (Yee
and Bailenson, 2007). For example, in the case of racial bias as
reported by Groom et al. (2009) participants were placed in a job
interview, which is a situation where implicit racial bias typically
operates.
However, this approach cannot explain how there can be
perceptual and implicit attitude changes when participants are
embodied in a virtual body in a neutral situation—i.e., where
there is no social context or when the effect is physiological
or perceptual rather than social. For example, recent research
employing multisensory integration techniques derived from
the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) has
shown that even pain and temperature sensitivity thresholds of
people can be changed through transformed body ownership
(Llobera et al., 2013; Martini et al., 2013). As another example
where there was no social context, Banakou et al. (2013)
carried out an experiment where adults were embodied in a
virtual body representing a toddler (4 or 5 years old), or an
adult body that was shrunk down to the size of the child,
so that the eye heights were the same in both cases. Hence
the only difference between the two bodies was the body
shape—childlike or adult-like. When the virtual body moved
synchronously with the real body movements of the participant
then there was strong body ownership over the virtual body—
irrespective as to whether it was the child or adult one.
Moreover, participants with the child body approximately doubly
overestimated the sizes of objects in the virtual environment,
comparing after with before the stimulation, whereas those
with the adult body did not. An Implicit Association Test
(IAT) (Greenwald et al., 1998) was used to test the extent to
which participants associated child-like or adult like attributes
to themselves. Those in the child body condition associated
child-like attributes to themselves far more than those with the
adult body (who hardly made such attributes at all). When
there was visuomotor asynchrony (the virtual body moved
independently of the real one, even though there was still first
person perspective view over the body) all of these results
were extinguished. This was in a context where the only task
of participants was to look at themselves (seeing their virtual
body) both directly looking down toward their real body, and
in the virtual mirror. Hence in this case, since there was no
social context, Self-Perception Theory and stereotyping could not
apply.
It is possible that in the case of child embodiment the
brain relies on autobiographical memory—since all the adults
of course had once been children. In order to test this we
turned to another example of embodiment where it would
not be possible for autobiographical memory to be a factor.
Peck et al. (2013) embodied White participants in a Black
body. This was a between groups experiment (n = 15 per
group), where White (female) participants were embodied in
a Black body, a White body, a Purple body, or No Body.
Participants saw their virtual body either directly by looking
down toward themselves and in a virtual mirror. In the
case of the “No body” condition participants saw a reflected
Black body at the correct place geometrically in the mirror,
but it moved asynchronously with their movements. In all
other cases there was visuomotor synchrony. The scenario
was neutral—participants spent altogether 12 min embodied
in this way, in an empty room, and eventually 12 virtual
characters walked by them (6 White characters and 6 Black).
The characters entered their personal space as they walked
by. Unlike the study of Groom et al. (2009) there was no
social meaning to this that had anything in itself to do with
racial bias. A racial IAT was used as the main response
variable. It was administered approximately 3 days before the
virtual reality exposure (preIAT) and then immediately after
(postIAT). The variable of interest was dIAT = postIAT–
preIAT.
The levels of body ownership were equivalent for the three
embodied conditions and lower for the No body condition. Those
with the Black body showed significantly less implicit racial bias
after the experiment compared to before—in fact the mean level
of dIAT< 0 only for this group. The inclusion of the purple body
as a control showed that this was probably a racial effect rather
than only being a difference or strangeness effect.
This result seemed to be stunning in the sense that it was hard
to believe that 12 min of exposure to being embodied in a Black
virtual bodymight alter something that is as apparently ingrained
as implicit racial bias. However, similar results were reported by
Maister et al. (2013) where the Rubber Hand Illusion (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998) with a black arm or white arm (control) was
used. An overview of this set of experiments can be found in
Maister et al. (2015).
In this paper we describe an experiment that takes these results
further. Here the hypothesis was that embodiment of White
people in dark-skinned virtual body would lead to a reduction
in negative implicit racial bias toward Black people, as described
earlier except that we were specifically interested in whether the
illusion would last at least 1 week after the final exposure. We
were also interested in whether multiple exposures might further
strengthen the reduction in racial bias. We carried out two
conceptually distinct experiments that we refer to as Experiment
1 and Experiment 2 in order to address these questions.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experimental Design
This experiment was designed to address the question as to
whether there is any sustained reduction in implicit racial bias—
in particular that lasts at least 1 week -after embodiment of
White participants in a Black body, and also whether the effect
is influenced by the number of exposures.
The scenario was one where participants were encouraged
to follow the movements of a (virtual) Tai Chi teacher. Each
participant was embodied in either a Black or White body
(Figures 1A,B). The participants had either 1, 2, or 3 exposures,
each separate by 2 days. In Experiment 1 the Tai Chi teacher
was of Asian appearance (Figures 1A,B). There was visuomotor
synchrony so that through real-time motion capture the virtual
body moved in synchrony and correspondence with real body
movements. Each exposure consisted of a 5-min orientation
period, and then the Embodiment condition for 10 min. The
experiment is illustrated in Supplementary Video S11.
In all conditions the participants were administered a racial
IAT test 1 week before their first (or only) exposure (preIAT).
They were administered a second IAT always 1 week after their
final exposure (postIAT). Hence for each participant, no matter
how many exposures they had, they were administered the IAT
only twice—1 week before their first exposure and 1 week after
their last exposure. The response variable of interest is dIAT =
postIAT–preIAT.
Experiment 1 therefore followed a single factor between
groups design and an independent variable. The factor was
Embodiment (White, Black) indicating the type of body in
which participants were embodied. The independent variable
was Exposure (the number of exposures to the scenario, 1,
2, or 3). There were 10 participants per group, thus 60 in
all, females recruited from the campus at the University of
Barcelona.
Experiment 2 was carried out under the same conditions as
the first and with another group of 30 participants. The difference
was that the Teacher was of European appearance, and the
participants (10 per cell) were always embodied as White. Hence
the experimental independent variable was Exposures (1, 2, or 3
as before). The reason for this second experiment is explained in
the Results section.
Technical Details
Environment
The experiment was conducted in a Virtual Reality (VR) lab
(width: 2.96 m, length: 3.4 m—back wall to curtain—height:
2.87 m). Participants were fitted with a stereo NVIS nVisor
SX111 head-mounted display. This has dual SXGA displays with
76◦H × 64◦V (degrees) field of view (FOV) per eye, totaling
a wide field-of-view 111◦ horizontal with 50◦ (66%) overlap
and 64◦ vertical, with a resolution of 1280 × 1024 pixels per
eye displayed at 60 Hz. Head tracking was performed by a 6-
DOF Intersense IS-900 device. Participants were also required
to wear an Optitrack full body motion capture suit that uses
1A higher resolution version can be seen on https://youtu.be/RcBJ1sCPv_I
FIGURE 1 | The experimental scenario, with variations in the virtual
body of the participant and the teacher. (A) The participant is embodied in
a White virtual body and the Teacher is Asian. (B) The participant is in a Black
virtual body and the Teacher is Asian. (C) The participant is in a White virtual
body and the teacher is European (Experiment 2). (D) The physical apparatus
worn by participants—the head-mounted display and the motion capture suit.
37 markers and the Motive software2 to track their movements
(Figure 1D). The infrared technology was implemented with
a 12-camera truss setup by OptiTrack. Virtual models created
with 3D Studio Max 20103 and Autodesk Character Generator4.
The virtual environment was implemented on the Unity 3D
platform5.
Tai Chi Animation
The Tai Chi animation was based on a motion captured Tai
Chi animation6, which was used as a reference to manually
build the animation clips. As Tai Chi movements are challenging
for beginners to perform, the continuous form of the original
clip was broken down into shorter animation clips. These were
triggered by the experimenter throughout the experiment. Nine
short clips were used in total. The animation was implemented in
Autodesk Motion Builder 20147.
2http://www.naturalpoint.com/optitrack/products/motive/body/
3http://usa.autodesk.com/3ds-max/
4https://charactergenerator.autodesk.com
5http://unity3d.com
6http://abranimations.com/new-mocap-tai-chi-animation/
7http://www.autodesk.com/products/motionbuilder/overview
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Participants
Sixty (Experiment 1) and 30 (Experiment 2) female participants
aged 18–44 years (mean age 21.9, SD = 4.45, SE = 0.47)
with normal or corrected vision took part in this study. They
had no prior knowledge of the experiment, and little or no
prior experience of VR. Participants were recruited through
posters, e-mail and word of mouth around the campus of
the University of Barcelona. Preliminary checks established
whether participants fitted the inclusion criteria (Caucasian only,
no psychoactive medication, no mental-health disorders, no
epilepsy). Participants were provided with an information sheet
regarding issues such as the limits of confidentiality, right to
withdraw (either during the experiment or later) etc. Written
informed consent was obtained. The experimental groups were
comparable across a number of variables. The age distribution
of participants is shown per condition in Table 1. Almost all
the participants were novices in computer programming. In
Experiment 1 43/60 played computer video games to a moderate
extent (47/60 less than twice a year) with little variation between
the experimental groups. In Experiment 2, 24/30 played less than
twice a year. On a scale of 1 (no experience) to 7 (extensive)
previous experience of VR, the medians are at most 4 across all
experimental groups, with the maximum IQR of 4.
Procedures
On a first visit, participants were given the study information
sheet to read and after they agreed to participate they were given a
consent form to sign. Next they completed a short demographics
questionnaire (i.e., age, occupation, VR, and games experience
etc.) and then completed a racial bias Implicit Association Test
(IAT) (Greenwald et al., 1998, 2003) on a desktop computer, and
the results were recorded (preIAT). After a period of 1 week they
returned for their first (or only) exposure in themain experiment.
The position of all participants was controlled through Velcro
strips on the floor that were used to mark where they should
stand during the experiment. These positions corresponded to
the centers of the physical and virtual room. Participants were
instructed to turn and move their heads and bodies and walk a
maximum two steps away from that area, to prevent them from
hitting the walls due to the restricted laboratory space.
During the orientation phase of the experiment, participants
entered a virtual room decorated with everyday furniture and a
virtual mirror. The body of the participant was substituted by the
Black or White virtual body, seen from first-person perspective
(1PP) (Figure 1). The participant’s head and body movements
were mapped in real time to the virtual body. They could see
TABLE 1 | Mean ± Standard Deviation of Age by experimental conditions.
Teacher Asian Exposures
Embodiment 1 2 3
Black 21.5 ± 3.54 20.3 ± 1.41 22.4 ± 2.80
White 19.9 ± 1.73 20.8 ± 2.74 21.7 ± 2.36
Teacher European 26.9 ± 9.78 21.9 ± 3.25 22.0 ± 3.80
this body both by looking directly toward their real body, and
also in the virtual mirror. A series of instructions were then given
to the participants from a pre-recorded audio. First, they were
instructed to perform a simple set of stretching exercises in order
to explore the capabilities and real time motion of the virtual
body, including movements of their arms, legs and feet. They
were asked to continue performing these exercises by themselves
and also look around the virtual room in all directions, where
they were asked to state and describe what they saw. After this
5-min orientation period, participants were instructed that the
second virtual character they would see in the room in front of
them would be a Tai Chi teacher who would perform different
movements that they should follow. They were free to choose
whether they performed each movement simultaneously with
the teacher or after the movement was completed. The Tai Chi
training went on for 10 min, the same for all conditions and
exposure repetitions. The reason of choosing such a setup was
to engage participants for the total time required in the virtual
environment, and to constantly reinforce visuomotor synchrony.
The whole procedure lasted approximately 35 min. Finally, the
HMD was removed, and they completed a questionnaire about
their experience, including questions about the level of subjective
body ownership (Table 2). Those in themultiple exposure groups
returned to the laboratory for their second and third sessions
2 days and 4 days later. One week after completion of the final
exposure, all participants returned to the lab in order to perform
the IAT again (postIAT). Two experimental operators (females)
were present throughout the whole experiment.
Response Variables
Racial Implicit Association Test (IAT)
Implicit racial bias was calculated by administering participants
an IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), 1 week before their first virtual
exposure, and 1 week after their last (or unique) virtual exposure.
The IAT was completed on the same desktop computer screen
both times.
The racial IAT followed the standard IAT procedure (Nosek
et al., 2005), where participants are required to rapidly categorize
faces (White or Black) and words (positive or negative) into
groups. Implicit bias is calculated from the differences in accuracy
and speed between categorizations (e.g., white faces, positive
TABLE 2 | Post Exposure Questionnaire—set of statements each on a −3
to 3 scale with −3 being strong disagreement and 3 being complete
agreement.
Variable Name Statement
MyBody “I felt that the virtual body I saw when looking down at myself
was my own body”
TwoBodies “I felt as if I had two bodies”
Mirror “I felt that the virtual body I saw when looking at myself in the
mirror was my own body”
Features “I felt that my virtual body resembled my own (real) body in
terms of shape, skin tone, or other visual features”
Agency “I felt that the movements of the virtual body were caused by
my own movements”
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words and black faces, negative words compared to the opposite
groups). Higher IAT scores are interpreted as the greater implicit
racial bias, as this signifies longer reaction times and greater
inaccuracies in categorizing black faces with positive words, and
white faces with negative words. It has been shown that mean IAT
scores tend to show slightly stronger associations corresponding
to the pairings of the combined block that is completed first
(Nosek et al., 2005). To control for this effect, the order of the
combined blocks was counterbalanced between participants as
proposed by Nosek et al. (2007).
Post-experience Questionnaire
After each exposure a 5-statement post-questionnaire was
administered to assess subjective experience of participants
(Table 2). A 7-point scale was used ranging from −3 to +3,
with “0” indicating a neutral response on each question (with
the scale varying from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree).
More specifically, these questions were related to the strength of
body ownership (MyBody, Mirror) and agency (Agency)—here
we require that the levels of body ownership and agency are the
same between the two conditions—while others served as control
questions (Features, TwoBodies).
Ethics
The study was approved by Comissió Bioètica of Universitat
de Barcelona. Ethical considerations included informed consent,
right to withdraw, confidentiality and sources of support, if
required. Exclusion criteria were epilepsy, use of medication,
recent consumption of alcohol, significant back or neck
difficulties, intellectual disability and mental health difficulties
(e.g., requiring medication), as well race other than Caucasian.
Inclusion criteria were as reported in Section Participants.
Participants were paid between e15 and e25 (Euros) for
participating, according to the number of exposures to which
they were assigned, or a pro-rata rate if they chose to withdraw
(5e at the end of the first session and the rest after the end of the
last session). Following completion of the last phase, participants
were debriefed with an explanation about the purpose of the
study. They were also given the opportunity to leave their name
and address if they wanted a short summary of the outcomes of
the study. All participants were contacted via email 1 week after
completion of the experiment to make sure there were not any
undesired “after-effects” from exposure to the VR system.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
First we consider the questionnaire responses on body ownership
and agency (Table 2). Figure 2 shows the scores on body
ownership. The variable MyBody refers to the degree to which
participants felt as if the body they saw when looking toward
themselves was their body, TwoBodies refers to the extent to
which they felt they had two bodies. Mirror refers to the body
they saw in the mirror, and Features refers to the extent to
which participants affirmed that the virtual body had physical
features in common with themselves. TwoBodies is considered
as a control question for MyBody and Mirror. All are on a scale
FIGURE 2 | Box plots of body ownership questions by Embodiment
and Exposure (A) for MyBody and TwoBodies (B) for Mirror and Features.
The thick black horizontal lines are the medians, the boxes are the interquartile
ranges, and the whiskers extend to ±1.5 × IQR, or the range. Individual points
are outliers.
from−3 to 3, where−3 means strongly disagree and+3 strongly
agree. It is clear that participants tended to affirm the virtual body
as their own, irrespective of skin color and irrespective of the
number of exposures. On the other hand, they tended to disagree
with the feeling of having two bodies. Comparing TwoBodies
withMyBody andMirror it can be seen that even the interquartile
ranges of TwoBodies do not intersect those of MyBody and
Mirror. Features is the lowest for the Black Embodiment and
somewhat higher for theWhite Embodiment, in line with the fact
that theWhite virtual body would havemore in commonwith the
bodies of the participants than the Black body. To test whether
there is a difference in scores on Features between the Black
and White body we carried out a mixed effects ordered logistic
regression of Features on Embodiment×Exposure. Neither the
interaction term (P > 0.38) nor Exposure as a main effect (P >
0.79) are significant, whereas eliminating Exposure we find that
Embodiment has z = 2.86, P = 0.004. Hence the appearance in
Figure 2B that Features in theWhite Embodiment is greater than
in the Black Embodiment is supported.
Agency, referring to the extent to which participants affirmed
that the virtual body’s movements were their own (Table 2), had
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amedian of 3 in all conditions with the interquartile range, and in
most cases the range, no more than 1. This reflects that the real-
time motion capture system worked well, since it was in fact the
case that the virtual body was programmed to move in synchrony
and correlation with real body movements.
Figure 3 shows the plot of postIAT by preIAT across
participants in both experiments. It is clear that there is one
outlier (id 38), corresponding to a participant in Experiment 1
(Asian teacher) who had 2 exposures. This data point is excluded
from subsequent analysis.
Recall that the racial bias IAT was measured for each person
1 week prior to their first virtual reality exposure. Lower values
of IAT indicate less implicit bias against Black. For Experiment
1 preIAT has mean 0.59 ± 0.037 (SE) (n = 59). For those in the
White embodied group the postIAT mean ± SE is 0.60 ± 0.055
(n= 30), and for those in the Black embodied group 0.36± 0.059
(n = 29). In line with previous results the Black embodiment
appears to have reduced the degree of bias but not changed bias
to non-bias.
Figure 4 provides amore complete picture showing themeans
and standard errors of dIAT by the two factors. Recalling that
the postIAT was measured 1 week after the final exposure what
is interesting is that the results are quite similar to the single
exposure experiment of Peck et al. (2013) where the postIAT
was measured immediately after the exposure. In that earlier
experiment we also found that the mean IAT increased for the
White embodied group and decreased for the Black embodied
group. We see the same here for those who had only 1 exposure.
The number of exposures may have an influence and at each
exposure level the decrease in IAT appears to be greater in the
Black embodied group than the White.
Using dIAT as the response variable for ANOVA results in
residual errors that are not compatible with normality whereas
using postIAT as the response variable with preIAT as a covariate
resolves this problem—although the results in both cases are very
similar. For comparison purposes with the results of Peck et al.
(2013) we provide the analysis using dIAT in Supplementary
FIGURE 3 | Scatter diagram of postIAT by preIAT for all participants in
Experiments 1 and 2.
Text (#1). ANCOVA of postIAT on Embodiment × Exposures
with preIAT as the covariate reveals no interaction (P > 0.58).
Removing the interaction term we find that Embodiment has
F(1, 55) = 9.02, P = 0.004 (Partial η
2 = 0.14), Exposures has
F(1, 55) = 1.96, P = 0.17 (Partial η
2 = 0.03). The Overall R2 =
0.26. If we therefore remove Exposure then Embodiment has
F(1, 56) = 7.81, P = 0.004 (η
2 = 0.14). The covariate preIAT of
course always makes a major contribution in each of the models.
For example, in the last model preIAT has F(1, 56) = 7.81, P =
0.007, (Partial η2 = 0.12). Overall R2 = 0.24. The Shapiro-Wilk
test for normality of the residuals results in z = 1.34, P = 0.09.
Experiment 2
We were interested in why dIAT might decrease with increasing
exposures, even if slightly, also for those in the White body. This
could have occurred simply because prior experience with IAT
tends to diminish the likelihood of biased responses (Greenwald
and Nosek, 2001) and in this experiment each participant was
administered the IAT twice. However, if this were the case then
we would have expected those with only one exposure to show
a decreased IAT, but in fact for those in the White Embodiment
group it increases. Alternatively, the effect might occur because
of the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Van
Bavel and Cunningham, 2009) which states that positive contact
with non-involved other out-group members can generalize to
reduction in bias to other groups. In our case the other out-group
member was the Teacher, who was of Asian appearance.
Therefore, we carried out a second experiment under the
same conditions as the first and with a different group of
30 participants, except that the Teacher was of European
appearance, and the participants (10 per cell) were always
embodied as White. If the contact hypothesis were operating, we
would expect a reduction in IAT after exposure.
The body ownership results are similar to those of Experiment
1 (Supplementary Text #2). Figure 5 shows the results for dIAT
combining the Embodied White with the Asian Teacher from
Experiment 1 and the new results from Experiment 2. We find
FIGURE 4 | Bar chart (means and standard errors) of dIAT by
Embodiment (Black, White) and Exposures (1,2,3), Experiment 1.
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FIGURE 5 | Bar chart showing means and SEs of dIAT by Teacher and
Exposures.
again that the IAT increases after the first exposure with White
Embodiment, repeating the result found by Peck et al. (2013)
and in Experiment 1 above. There is a hint that indeed the
Asian teacher might reduce the IAT more than the European if
there is more than one exposure. However, ANCOVA of postIAT
on Teacher×Exposures with preIAT as the covariate shows no
interaction effect (P > 0.68) and no main effect of Teacher (P >
0.86). Eliminating the interaction term the main effect of Teacher
is still not significant (P > 0.59) but Exposures has P = 0.037.
Eliminating Teacher results in Exposures having significance
level P = 0.036, F(1, 57) = 4.60, R
2 = 0.20. (Shapiro-Wilk test for
normality of the residual errors results in z = 0.379, P = 0.35).
Since Teacher has no effect we can pool all results of both
experiments together and test amongst all n = 89 participants
(recall that there is one deleted observation) for the effect
of Embodiment and Exposures on postIAT with preIAT as a
covariate. This is shown in Figure 6. ANCOVA of postIAT on
Embodiment × Exposures with preIAT as covariate shows no
interaction effect (P > 0.43). Eliminating the interaction term we
find that Embodiment results in F(1,85) = 9.34, P = 0.003, Partial
η
2 = 0.10. For Exposures F(1,85) = 4.51, P = 0.036, Partial η
2 =
0.05. (The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality results in z = 1.68,
P = 0.046).
Summary of Findings
The evidence from Experiment 1 suggests that Embodiment in
the Black body results in a reduction of implicit racial bias, even
1 week after the end of the experiment. However, the evidence
for the influence of multiple exposures is more ambiguous.
Figure 4 indicates that there may be some effect even if not
statistically significant. The results from Experiment 2 support
the conclusion that the Embodied Black condition does reduce
implicit bias irrespective of the number of exposures. However,
there is also evidence that bias also decreases with the number
of exposures independently of the Embodiment factor (White
or Black body). The evidence suggests that the Teacher (Asian,
Caucasian) had no influence on bias.
FIGURE 6 | Bar chart showing means and SEs of dIAT for all
observations (n = 89) by Embodiment and Exposures.
DISCUSSION
Body Ownership
Body ownership through first person perspective (1PP) with
respect to the virtual body that visually substitutes the real body is
a long-standing result. For example, Petkova and Ehrsson (2008)
used video cameras mounted on the head of a manikin looking
down toward its body, but fed the video stream via a head-
mounted display to participants. Provided they were looking
down they would see the manikin body as substituting their
own. Combined with synchronous visuotactile stimulation on
the manikin and real body, so that participants saw something
touching the manikin trunk while feeling this synchronously
and correspondingly with touches on their body, there was
an illusion of body ownership. When there was visuotactile
asynchrony the illusion of ownership was significantly reduced.
This was backed up by arousal responses (skin conductance)
when the manikin body was attacked, but only in the visuotactile
synchronous condition. Slater et al. (2010) used virtual reality
to similar effect—when participants in a head-tracked head
mounted display delivered VR and looked down toward their
real body and in a virtual mirror they would see a life-sized
virtual body, including the movements of the virtual head that
were synchronous and in correspondence with their real head
movements. There was a strong illusion of body ownership
in the 1PP condition compared to a third person perspective
(3PP) condition. Moreover, a strong heart-rate deceleration
corresponded to seeing the virtual body attacked in the 1PP
but not in the 3PP condition. Unlike Petkova and Ehrsson
(2008) synchronous visuotactile stimulation was not necessary to
achieve this effect. These two results are discussed by Maselli and
Slater (2013), where it was found that 1PP was dominant, and the
discrepancy between the two studies might be accounted for by
the plastic look of the manikin in the first study, and the more
realistic appearance of the virtual body in the second (i.e., with
more human skin tones). Petkova et al. (2011) also support 1PP
as a critical contributor to the ownership illusion.
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In the current experiment we used visuomotor synchrony
based on real-time motion capture data applied to the
virtual body rather than visuotactile synchrony. Several studies
have found strong ownership illusions using this method in
combination with 1PP—for example (Banakou et al., 2013;
Banakou and Slater, 2014). Kokkinara and Slater (2014) directly
compared the effects of individual and combined influences
of visuomotor and visuotactile synchrony, and found that
visuomotor was more likely to lead to the illusion, but that in
the case where both visuomotor and visuotactile were present the
illusion could be equally broken by changing either one of them
to asynchronous.
Finally, there is also the evidence suggesting that the
appearance of the virtual human body does not play a role in
the illusion. For example, in Slater et al. (2010) the participants
were all men but virtually embodied as a young girl. In Kilteni
et al. (2013) and Peck et al. (2013) all participants were light-
skinned but the level of body ownership did not differ between a
light-skinned, dark-skinned or even a purple body. In Normand
et al. (2011) the participants were thin males, but had subjective
ownership over a fat virtual body experienced from 1PP and
with visuotactile synchrony. Most recently in Osimo et al. (2015)
young male participants experienced a virtual body that was a
scanned 3D digital copy of their own real body, and a virtual
body that was much older depicting Sigmund Freud, in a within
group design. Again there was no difference in the level of body
ownership even when one virtual body looked very much like
themselves, and the other was much older.
Blanke et al. (2015) argued that body consciousness requires
integration of proprioception, top-down body-related visual
information in peripersonal space, and embodiment. Our setup
well integrates these, and is compatible with the multisensory
integration approach discussed by Ehrsson (2012). Since there
is visuomotor synchrony, proprioception is intimately connected
with body-related visual events occurring in peripersonal space,
with embodiment such that all sensory information about the
virtual body is centered on the location of the real body. Putting
this simply, and as we argued in Banakou and Slater (2014),
in our whole lives whenever we look down we see our own
body. Whenever (under normal healthy conditions) we move
our limbs we feel them move (proprioception) and what we
see moving are our own limbs. This history therefore provides
overwhelming evidence that what we see in virtual reality under
conditions of 1PP + visuomotor synchrony is our own body.
The fact that it does not look like our body seems to be
discounted in the brain’s computation of body ownership, and
in any case in terms of perception there is no “alternative
hypothesis” since the virtual body is the only visible body in
peripersonal space. Clark (2013) in a review of the predictive
brain paradigm points out that the brain’s perceptual system
constructs models based on top-down connections that predict
a version of the sensory stimuli it is receiving. Hence the model
“this is my body” would certainly account for the multisensory
information that the virtual body is both visually where the
body should be, and integrates proprioception with intentional
movement, and looks like a human body. However, it seems that
the brain extends this model to include consequences of this
being “my body” even when it does not look like it normally
looks.
Reducing Implicit Racial Bias
The study has several findings in relation to implicit racial bias.
The first is that the earlier results reported by Peck et al. (2013)
have been reproduced taking into account those who had only
one exposure. After one exposure for those embodied in the
Black virtual body the mean implicit bias against Black decreases
compared to those embodied in the White body. Second, the
reduction is sustained for at least 1 week. Third, the number of
exposures may have an effect independently of type of body, a
point we will return to below.
It is important to note that the setting of the experiment was a
benign one—a Teacher showing the participants various Tai Chi
movements. In contrast, the finding of Groom et al. (2009) stands
out as the one case where embodiment of White participants in
a Black virtual body resulted in an increase in implicit racial bias.
Although there are many technical differences between the setup
in that experiment and ours, as detailed by Peck et al. (2013),
and there was no notion of body ownership, the fundamental
difference is that the Groom study included a negative social
setting (a job interview) that in itself was related to racial bias. In
the present study, unlike that of Peck et al. (2013) there was also
a social setting—but it was a benign one, unrelated to the issue of
racial bias.
Amongst the least successful 17 interventions for the
reduction of bias discussed by Lai et al. (2014) were those that
employed perspective taking. Superficially perspective taking is,
amongst the methods considered, the closest to the technique
of embodiment. Participants were required to imagine that they
were the person shown in a picture and describe how they might
experience an event as that person, their emotions, thoughts and
feelings, based on the method described by Ames et al. (2008).
Thus, with the subject of the experiment being White and the
person shown in the picture being Black, this would be like an
imaginal equivalent of embodiment. However, the critical point is
that it is imaginal, whereas virtual embodiment is direct, leading
to a perceptual illusion of body ownership. Moreover, in the case
of virtual embodiment participants are not required to imagine
anything or think about how it would be to be that person, they
simply see the virtual body that moves in correspondence with
their own movements, both by looking toward it and in a mirror.
Participants only have to experience, they do not have to imagine.
Moreover, unlike the studies reported by Lai et al. (2016) the
evidence suggests that the embodiment intervention results in a
sustained reduction of implicit bias that lasts at least 1 week. We
discuss some possible reasons why in the next section.
The IAT
One way to think about an IAT is that it samples for any
individual their statistical associations between categories. If over
a long period a person has been subject to information that
X is associated with Y but not Z and they are given X with
two cues Y and Z there is a higher probability that they will
choose Y at a greater speed than they would choose Z in a
forced choice. A racial bias IAT ultimately tests the strength of
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 601
Banakou et al. Virtual Embodiment and Racial Bias
such associations. We contend that in most Western countries
there has been a greater preponderance in the media of negative
associations with the concept of “Black” people compared to
“White,” and the racial IAT reflects this in spite of the explicit
attitudes of people, so that there is a dissociation between the
implicit and explicit bias (Greenwald and Krieger, 2006). Indeed
in the explicit racial attitudes test in Peck et al. (2013) there was
no evidence of racial bias, even though the pre-experiment IAT
showed implicit bias. However, when it comes to discriminatory
behavior the IAT results have better predictive power for social
interaction than explicit measures (Greenwald et al., 2009)—
for example, with respect to eye contact, proxemics, and hiring
practice (Ziegert and Hanges, 2005; Rooth, 2010). Even though
the use and interpretation of the IATmay be controversial there is
significant evidence of its explanatory and predictive power (Jost
et al., 2009).
Now based on this model of how the IAT may work we
consider how it can be possible that relatively short exposures
of embodiment in a Black virtual body can impact and reduce
implicit bias. One answer may be that body ownership and
agency over a virtual body is more than a superficial illusion, that
it goes beyond the perceptual to influence cognitive processing.
We argued in Banakou et al. (2013) and Llobera et al. (2013)
that a fundamental mechanism may be through the postulated
“cortical body matrix” (Moseley et al., 2012), that maintains a
multi-sensory representation of the space immediately around
the body in a body-centered reference frame. The system is
responsible for homeostatic regulation of the body, and for
dynamically reconstructing the body representation moment to
moment based on current multisensory information. Moreover,
we propose that it also maintains an overall consistency between
the multifaceted aspects of self (personality, attitudes, behaviors)
and the body representation. In other words our suggestion is
that when the body changes not only are there updates to the
multisensory representation of peripersonal space but also there
are corresponding psychological updates. For example, when
adults are embodied in a child body not only do they overestimate
object sizes but they self-identify more with child-like attributes
in an IAT classifying self with adult or child-like attributes
(Banakou et al., 2013). We can view IAT changes as direct
evidence of this idea, that changing the body apparently leads
to changes in implicit attitudes. This is not a process whereby
participants in any way believe that their body has changed, nor
might they explicitly say that their attitude is now different, but
it is a process that occurs below the threshold of consciousness.
We can say that as well as body ownership over a different body
leading to changes in implicit attitudes, the documented changes
in implicit attitudes are a very strong signal that in fact there has
been a change in body ownership.
Now as we argued the IAT is simply a statistical measure of
association between categories for any individual, for example,
based on a lifetime of statistical associations from the social
environment. We can think of this as there being a current
joint probability distribution over the sets of categories, and the
IAT is based on sampling this distribution. Now thinking of
this in Bayesian terms the process of embodiment, where e.g.,
the White person now has a Black body, provides a strongly
weighted piece of new evidence that leads to an update of this
probability distribution. The vast amount of statistical evidence
that made up the probability distribution is for most people
based on impersonal evidence. It is just picked up from everyday
commentary, for example, in the media. Now though there
is a new piece of “evidence” of critical importance—“I” have
a Black skin, and “I” in turn carries with it a whole set of
associations with the positively/negatively valenced categories
that are likely to be very different from the associations with the
out-group. This leads to a new probability distribution—as if the
new embodiment information disrupts the previous associations
between categories. The one piece of new evidence is a critical
one—since it is about the self. Hence it could be argued that the
changes in IAT are produced by a disruption of the standard
associations between “Black” and “negative”—based on the new
observation that “I can be Black.” In the terminology of the
opening paragraph of this section X (Black) is typically associated
with Y (a set of negative attributes) but not Z (a set of positive
attributes), so that in rapid sampling of associations with X there
is higher probability of choosing elements from Y instead of
Z. However, the embodiment of Self as Black can change the
associations with X because X has now been identified with Self,
which in turn will have its own distribution of probabilities over
elements in Y and Z. Hence sampling the associations with X after
embodiment is, in this explanation, likely to lead to a different
outcome than prior to embodiment. However, this argument
relies on the participant being more likely to have positive (Z)
than negative (Y) associations with Self. This leads to the testable
hypothesis that the reduction in IAT should be more likely to
occur for individuals with higher self-esteem than those with
lower self-esteem. We do not have such data in this experimental
study, but this is left as further work as a way to test this model.
From our current results it seems that just one exposure is
already sufficient to disrupt the probability distribution in this
model. This argument is similar to that of Maister et al. (2015):
that similarity between appearance of the self (as transformed
during body ownership) and the out-group results in the
disruption of associations between the out-group and negative
valence items, and substituted by positive associations with the
self.
The IAT and Saliency
Treating IAT as measuring associations though is only one way
(even if the dominant one) for understanding how this measure
works. Rothermund andWentura (2004) introduced an alternate
figure-ground explanation, where the most salient aspects of the
target tend to be associated with the most salient attributes,
independently of whether there are psychological associations
between the two categories. For example, suppose the target
categories are the musical instruments sitars and pianos, and
the attributes are words with positive and negative valence.
The explanation supposes that sitars are more salient, being
the more unusual in most countries, appearing as a figure
against the background of the more common pianos. Similarly,
unpleasant words stand out more against the background
of pleasant or neutral words. Hence subjects find it easier
to quickly associate two salient categories together, even
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though there may be no intrinsic psychological association
between sitars and negative words. In a series of experiments
Rothermund and Wentura (2004) provided strong evidence
that this explanation is viable—although the two different
explanations, associative and figure-ground, are not mutually
exclusive.
In our experiment it could be argued that the racial
categorisation “Black” is more salient than White, and therefore
is more likely to be associated with salient negative attributes
compared to positive. In this explanation embodiment of a
White person as Black changes the ground, so that Black is no
longer salient. However, this seems unlikely as an explanation
for these particular results. Participants had short embodiment
exposures and otherwise during the time of the experimental
period of course lived their normal lives in society where
“Black” would be more salient than “White.” Also we would
expect that more exposures as Black might make “Black” less
salient, but the number of exposures operated independently
of the type of embodiment. However, in the associations based
explanation a single embodiment exposure as “Black” in itself
provides evidence “I can be Black” and thus disrupt associations
between positively/negatively valenced attributes (since these
are now confounded with associations that apply to the
self).
The Number of Exposures
The results suggest that the number of exposures may be
associated with a decrease in implicit bias irrespective of the type
of embodiment. The explanation that this may be due to the
contact hypothesis was not borne out by Experiment 2. Apart
from simply being in VR the only other invariant across the two
embodiment groups was that all practiced Tai Chi movements as
part of the experiment. Tai Chi has been shown to have positive
psychological benefits including a reduction of stress and anxiety,
and more generally a number of positive health advantages—
see the meta studies by Sandlund and Norlander (2000) and
Jahnke et al. (2010). As noted by Sandlund and Norlander
(2000) Tai Chi has elements in common with mindfulness
meditation. Moreover, as reported by Lueke and Gibson (2014)
mindfulness meditation reduces implicit racial and age bias.
In that study participants listened to a 10 min mindfulness or
a control recording. Those in the mindfulness group showed
statistically significant but moderately less implicit bias than the
control group. Similarly, and with more striking results Lueke
and Gibson (2016) showed that a group that received a brief
mindfulness meditation exposure exhibited less behavioral racial
bias than control groups. Also in the context of prejudice against
persons with disabilities, Schimchowitsch and Rohmer (2016)
also showed moderate effects in the reduction of bias in a group
that practiced yoga and mediation compared to a control group
that did not. In our study the greater the number of exposures
that participants had the greater their exposure to Tai Chi, with
each Tai Chi session lasting for 10min. Of course we cannot know
whether or how much they entered any kind of meditative state,
or whether they thought any more about their experience outside
of the experimental sessions. It remains an intriguing possibility
though that simply their exposure to Tai Chi may have influenced
their level of implicit bias. We leave this as an open question for
further research.
CONCLUSIONS
Returning to the questions that this paper addressed our overall
findings are that: first, body ownership over a differently raced
body has again been shown to occur, suggesting that ownership
is not contingent on the appearance of the virtual body. Second,
there is further evidence that embodiment of White people
in a dark-skinned virtual body does diminish their implicit
racial bias. Third, this diminution lasts at least 1 week after
the end of the exposure. Finally, one exposure is sufficient to
observe this effect. Further replication studies would be needed
to further support the last point. Moreover, it is important to note
that the experiment involved only female participants. While
there is some evidence that there is greater implicit racial bias
amongst females compared to males (but greater explicit bias of
males compared to females) (Ekehammar et al., 2003), further
replication studies should address this issue.
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